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Introduction
The workhorse model of network competition generates a number of puzzling predictions concerning the termination rates network operators charge for connecting calls from one another and regarding call prices. First, theory predicts network pro…t to be independent of the reciprocal termination rate when operators compete in two-part call tari¤s and charge non-discriminatory call prices (La¤ont, Rey and Tirole, 1998a) . In reality, pro…t margins tend to fall whenever network operators are forced by regulators to lower their termination rates (Genakos and Valletti, 2011) . This discrepancy between predicted and observed e¤ects on pro…t constitutes a pro…t neutrality puzzle. 1 Pro…t is no longer independent of the termination rate when network operators engage in price discrimination between calls inside the network (on-net) and calls to other networks (o¤-net); see La¤ont, Rey and Tirole (1998b) . Yet, termination-based price discrimination addresses the pro…t neutrality puzzle only to introduce another. Operators now have an incentive to agree on termination rates below cost (Gans and King, 2001) . As o¤-net calls have a lower perceived marginal cost than on-net calls, the workhorse model predicts o¤-net call prices below on-net call prices. In reality, o¤-net calls are nearly always more expensive than on-net calls under price discrimination. This discrepancy between predicted and observed call prices constitutes an o¤ -net price puzzle.
In this paper I show that income e¤ects in call demand can solve both the pro…t neutrality puzzle and the o¤-net price puzzle. I consider network competition in two-part tari¤s under nondiscriminatory call prices, under termination-based price discrimination, and when consumers are heterogenous so that networks engage in second-degree price discrimination. I establish conditions under which even weak income e¤ects are enough to induce unregulated network operators to raise termination rates above cost. A positive markup on termination in turn implies o¤-net prices above on-net prices under price discrimination.
Extending the model to include income e¤ects is empirically relevant. With income e¤ects, call demand generally depends on the price of all types of calls, the subscription fee and on income. In a study of residential telephony in France, Aldebert et al. (2004) …nd consumers in higher income classes to display signi…cantly higher demand for local and national calls than consumers in lower income classes, and there are signi…cant cross-price elasticities between local, national and international calls. 2 For example, the estimated income elasticity of demand for 1 Under pro…t neutrality, network operators should not oppose to lowering termination rates at the regulator's request. This is not how operators usually respond to tighter regulation. Sweden constitutes an illustrative case in point. In 2004, the Swedish regulatory agency for telecommunications, PTS, deemed all four mobile operators, TeliaSonera, Tele2, Vodafone (later Telenor) and Hi3G to have signi…cant market power. PTS instructed the companies to lower their termination rates and has continued to do so every consecutive summer since then. The operators consistently refused to comply during the …rst three years of the new regulatory regime. The only exception was TeliaSonera who voluntarily lowered the rate on one occasion, in 2007. The termination rate disputes have been settled in court from 2008 and onwards, with …nal rulings being in favour of PTS on every account. Apparently, the operators have given up the …ght: Since 2008, they have only sporadically refused to lower their termination rates in accordance with PTS'demands.
2 I have not found any studies of mobile call demand using household data which report income elasticities. Danaher (2002) estimates a positive and signi…cant income e¤ect in a …eld experiment introducing a new subscription service similar to a cellular telephone service. Income is a dummy variable, taking on the value 1 if annual 2 local calls was approximately 20. With a monthly subscription fee of 10 Euros and a monthly after-tax income of 2000 Euros, this corresponds to an elasticity of call demand with respect to the subscription fee of approximately 0.1. 3 Thus, a 20 percent reduction in the subscription fee would increase call demand by 2 percent. The average residential mobile subscriber in Sweden makes approximately 140 call minutes per month (Table 18 in PTS, 2012), a 2 percent increase of which amounts to 2.8 minutes. The average length of a mobile call is 2.6 minutes (Table 19 in PTS, 2012) . Hence, a reduction in the monthly subscription fee from 10 to 8 Euros would cause the average Swedish subscriber to make one additional mobile call per month, with the estimated subscription elasticity of 0.1. This sounds plausible. Observe, however, that most of my results rest upon the assumption of a positive income e¤ect, not that it is particularly strong.
Considering income e¤ects is policy relevant. Based upon the results of the workhorse model one would conclude that the conditions for e¢ cient regulation are favorable. Policy makers could implement the …rst-best welfare optimum by means of a simple cost-based regulation:
Disallow termination-based price discrimination and demand termination rates equal to reported marginal termination cost. As the networks do not care about the termination rate under nondiscriminatory pricing, they have no incentive to lie about marginal cost, either. This paper shows that regulated networks instead have an incentive to strongly exaggerate marginal costs under cost-based regulation, even for weak income e¤ects. A well-designed regulatory policy needs to take these incentives into account instead of just accepting reported costs at face value.
Non-discriminatory call prices Each network operator maximizes pro…t by charging call prices equal to perceived marginal cost and using the subscription fee to compete for customers.
Thus, network pro…t stems entirely from the subscription fee and the termination pro…t on incoming calls. For call prices below the monopoly level, a higher termination rate means a higher termination pro…t, but has an adverse e¤ect on the subscription fee. To understand why the subscription fee falls as the termination rate goes up, observe that the operator can save on termination payments by completing a larger share of its calls in its own network. The higher is the termination rate, the stronger is this cost-saving incentive. The way to achieve more on-net termination is through a lower subscription fee and thereby a higher market share. In the workhorse model, the additional termination pro…t and the lower subscription fee cancel out under non-discriminatory call prices, leaving network pro…t una¤ected by changes in the termination rate.
Income e¤ects open a channel through which higher termination rates soften competition for subscribers. A higher termination rate means lower total call expenditures because the reduction in the subscription fee dominates the cost of higher call prices. This is the documented "wahousehold income exceeds $60,000 and 0 otherwise. This speci…cation renders it di¢ cult to estimate income elasticities. Grajek and Kretschmer (2009) estimate a positive and signi…cant relationship between mobile usage intensity and GDP per capita in a panel data analysis of 41 countries. Karacuka et al. (2011) …nd the same result in a study of the Turkish market for mobile telephony.
3 Let I be the income elasticity of call demand, and denote by t = I t=I (the absolute value of) the elasticity of call demand with respect to the subscription fee, t. If I = 20, t = 10, and I = 2000, then t = 0:1.
terbed" e¤ect (Genakos and Valletti, 2011) . A higher residual income (net of call expenditures) implies that marginal utility of income falls. The lower is marginal utility of income, the less important is the subscription fee for the consumers' choice of network, hence competition for consumers is softer. This represents a marginal income e¤ect on the intensity of competition.
Because pro…t neutrality is a knife-edge result, even an in…nitesimal income e¤ect is enough to tilt networks to favour very high termination rates under non-discriminatory call prices. Regulation is called for because unregulated networks would negotiate a reciprocal termination rate in excess of the socially optimal termination rate.
Termination-based price discrimination When all calls cost the same, consumers do not care about the size of the network they belong to. Size becomes important for the choice of network whenever network operators charge di¤erent prices for calls inside or outside the network. If on-net calls are cheaper than o¤-net calls, as is usually the case, consumers are drawn to the largest network to save on call expenditures. Cutting the subscription fee becomes extra pro…table to the individual operator in this case of tari¤-mediated network externalities (La¤ont, Rey and Tirole, 1998b) because increased network size attracts additional customers through a network multiplier. With constant market size, the multiplier is double: A negative externality arises in the competing network as that network becomes smaller and adds to the positive externality in the own network. In the end, tari¤-mediated network externalities simply reinforce competition for a …xed number of subscribers and drives down equilibrium subscription fees at the loss of the industry.
Competition for subscribers is more intense the higher is the termination rate because the price di¤erence between o¤-net and on-net calls then is larger and the network multiplier stronger. Hence, tari¤-mediated network externalities present a motive for network operators to jointly reduce termination rates. Unregulated networks trade the bene…t of the marginal income e¤ect and marginal termination pro…t o¤ against the cost of a stronger marginal network externality in their choice of termination rate. For any positive income e¤ect and if networks are su¢ ciently di¤erentiated, then network externalities matter relatively less for consumers'choice of network. In this case, unregulated networks negotiate a termination rate above cost, and as a consequence charge o¤-net prices above on-net prices. Conversely, the marginal network externality dominates the trade-o¤ if the income e¤ect is weak, and causes unregulated networks to agree on a termination rate below cost (Gans and King, 2001 ).
Second-degree price discrimination Network operators often sell subscriptions featuring on-net/o¤-net discrimination alongside subscriptions with non-discriminatory call prices. Presumably, these menus of contracts exist to account for consumer heterogeneity. Furthermore, incomplete information about consumer preferences requires retail contracts to be incentive compatible. In this model, the contract with on-net/o¤-net discrimination is designed for informed
consumers. An informed consumer is someone who knows whether the call recipient belongs to the own network or not. The contract with non-discriminatory call prices is intended for uninformed consumers, i.e. those who have no information about which network the call recipi-4 ent belongs to. 4 The incentive problem facing network operators is how to design contracts to prevent informed consumers from taking the non-discriminatory contract.
Consumer net surplus is entirely determined by the value of the non-discriminatory contract if the incentive compatibility (IC) constraint of the on-net/o¤-net contract is strictly binding.
The value of the non-discriminatory contract is independent of network size. But then, the individual operator cannot lower its subscription fee and take advantage of the negative network externality in the competing network present under termination-based price discrimination.
Hence, the network multiplier is smaller and retail competition weaker under second-degree price discrimination. This is true even if the share of consumers on on-net/o¤-net contracts is large, because incentive compatibility constraints are binding at individual consumer level.
The reduction in the network multiplier implies that the marginal impact of a higher termination rate on the intensity of competition is much smaller than under termination-based price discrimination, and tends to drive up operators'preferred termination rate. An additional rent extraction motive comes into play under second-degree price discrimination. Asymmetric information may force networks to leave informational rent to consumers. A higher termination rate makes the on-net/o¤-net contract more valuable to consumers because a stronger network externality intensi…es competition. The value of the non-discriminatory contract falls because a higher termination rate softens competition for uninformed consumers through the marginal income e¤ect. A higher termination rate thus relaxes the IC constraint of the on-net/o¤-net contract, thereby allowing networks to extract informational rent. Weak network externalities and marginal rent extraction are enough to render a termination rate above cost pro…table under second-degree price competition, even for weak income e¤ects.
Related literature
The workhorse, A-LRT, model of network competition was developed by Armstrong (1998) , who considered linear non-discriminatory call prices, and La¤ont, Rey and Tirole (1998a and b) , who allowed also two-part call tari¤s and price discrimination. The network competition literature now is extensive, see Armstrong (2002) and Vogelsang (2003) for surveys of the earlier literature, but until now only two papers have provided possible solutions to both the pro…t neutrality puzzle and the o¤-net price puzzle. Armstrong and Wright (2009) consider network arbitrage as their main mechanism. Two mobile operators prefer mobile-to-mobile (M2M) termination rates below cost to soften network competition. However, they would both like to exercise vertical market power against a third, …xed-line network by setting high …xed-to-mobile (F2M) termination rates. If the …xed-line operator can bypass termination by transiting calls via the competitor's mobile network, then it is impossible to uphold di¤erent termination rates. All termination is priced above cost if …xed-line termination pro…t is su¢ ciently important to mobile operators. This result extends trivially to non-discriminatory call prices because then mobile operators do not care about M2M
rates, but still care about F2M rates. Even the slightest arbitrage possibility would therefore cause M2M rates to jump to the level of the F2M rate. 5 Jullien et al. (2013) consider heterogenous call intensities and elastic total subscription demand as their main mechanism. "Light" users hold subscriptions mainly because they value receiving calls and have price elastic total demand. Aggregate demand of "heavy" users (the ones who initiate calls) is constant. The presence of light users softens competition for heavy users because a heavy user in the competitor's network generates a larger termination pro…t than a heavy user in the own network. The authors show that the networks then agree on termination rates above cost under non-discriminatory prices. 6 The same result holds when networks apply termination-based price discrimination to heavy users, under some additional conditions. The present paper di¤ers from Armstrong and Wright (2009) and Jullien et al. (2013) in examining an entirely di¤erent mechanism whereby income e¤ects in call demand play an important role for the choice of termination rates. Dessein (2003) conducts the …rst analysis of network competition with second-degree price discrimination. He assumes consumers to di¤er in terms of volume demand and that networks o¤er menus of contracts with non-discriminatory call prices. Pro…t is found to be independent of the termination rate even under second-degree price discrimination. The present analysis complements Dessein (2003) by allowing even subscriptions with on-net/o¤-net discrimination.
I show that unregulated networks prefer a termination rate at or below marginal termination cost if consumers' marginal utility of income is constant and equal to unity (as in A-LRT).
Hence, the pro…t neutrality puzzle and the o¤-net price puzzle both are robust to incomplete information about consumer preferences and second-degree price discrimination alone. An extra ingredient is needed; this paper emphasizes income e¤ects. Hurkens and López (2013) assume that consumers do not take the e¤ect of a price increase on network size into account when they select which network to subscribe to. Network externalities disappear under passive expectations, so the termination rate is set to maximize termination pro…t. 7 Network externalities are weaker than in A-LRT even in the present model, but in my 5 Armstrong and Wright's (2009) model relies on the assumption that F2M rates are set non-cooperatively, simultaneously with retail prices and subsequent to the (reciprocal) M2M rate. Finding the equilibrium when F2M and M2M rates are set simultaneously and prior to retail prices is still open for research. 6 The assumption that total subscription demand is elastic and negatively correlated with usage intensity is crucial. Dessein (2003) and Hahn (2004) assume constant aggregate demand of heavy and light users and show that pro…t neutrality still holds. Dessein (2003) and Armstrong and Wright (2009) allow elastic total subscription demand and …nd that it is more pro…table to lower the termination rate slightly below marginal cost than to increase it marginally. In a model with constant market size, Dessein (2004) …nds the pro…t maximizing termination rate to be below (above) marginal cost if light user demand is less (more) elastic than heavy user demand.
7 An intermediate stance is to assume that only a share of consumers have passive beliefs. Hoernig (2012) …nds the pro…t-maximizing termination rate to be above cost if and only if at least half of the consumers have passive expectations. Another way to soften network externalities is to assume that every subscriber only takes the actions of some other customers into account -they belong to so called "calling clubs" (Calzada and Valletti, 2008; Gabrielsen and Vagstad, 2008; Hoernig et al., 2011) . The smaller is the calling club, the weaker is the network externality and the higher is the termination rate. This result rests on the assumption that the members of the calling club do not coordinate the choice of network. In case of coordination, calling clubs have no e¤ect on 6 case this due to binding incentive constraints which render consumer net surplus independent of network size. 8 3 Non-discriminatory prices: The pro…t neutrality puzzle
The model I generalize A-LRT to allow for income e¤ects in call demand. A continuum of consumers with unit measure are uniformly distributed on the unit interval. Each consumer subscribes to one of two networks located at each end of the interval. I assume in this section that all calls originating from a network have the same price, whereas the next sections allow networks to discriminate between calls inside (on-net) and outside (o¤-net) one's own network.
A consumer with income I pays a subscription fee t, places x 0 calls at price r 0 per call to a fraction 2 (0; 1] of the other subscribers and consumes a numeraire good in quantity y 0 to maximize utility u (x) + z(y), subject to the budget constraint rx + y + t I. Call utility is three times continuously di¤erentiable, increasing and strictly concave: u 0 > 0 and u 00 < 0. The utility of consuming the numeraire good is three times continuously di¤erentiable, increasing and concave: z 0 > 0 and z 00 0. 9 A-LRT features quasi-linear utility:
where I is large. Setting 1 is a simple way of capturing the fact that consumers have a personal network which is (much) smaller than the total network. As utility is strictly increasing in consumption, the budget constraint is binding. Therefore, consumer net surplus equals v(r; t) = max
A di¤erence between this model and A-LRT is that call demand x(r; t) now decreases in the subscription fee t and not only in the call price r 10 : @x @r = z 0 z 00 rx u 00 + z 00 r 2 < 0, @x @t = z 00 r u 00 + z 00 r 2 0.
A consumer located at k 2 [0; 1] derives utility v 0 + v(r 1 ; t 1 ) k=2 from subscribing to network 1 and utility v 0 + v(r 2 ; t 2 ) (1 k)=2 from subscribing to network 2, where 1=2 is the the optimal termination rate. The regulator can easily implement the …rst-best welfare optimum under passive beliefs or in the presence of calling clubs by prohibiting termination-based price discrimination and enforcing cost-based regulation of termination rates. Expectations about network size and calling clubs do not matter under non-discriminatory prices, and network operators have no incentive to distort the termination rate. 8 Other extensions of the model have been considered, too: Call externalities neither solve the pro…t neutrality puzzle, nor the o¤-net price puzzle (Armstrong, 2002; Jeon et al., 2004; Berger, 2005; Hurkens and López, 2010) . Calzada and Valletti (2008) and López and Rey (2012) …nd that termination rates above cost sometimes can be used to deter entry under termination-based price competition, but not under non-discriminatory call prices; for this later point see also Carter and Wright (2003) . Valletti and Cambini (2005) argue that networks might prefer termination rates above cost to curb investments in quality improvement under non-discriminatory prices.
9 Additively separable utility in x and y is a simplifying, but not crucial, assumption. Tangerås (2013) shows that the main results of this section go through even with non-separable utility V (x; y; ), provided V satis…es appropriate concavity assumptions, and x < 1 even as ! 0.
1 0 Call demand depends also on , but I have subsumed this in most of the analysis. I am mainly interested in the properties of the model as ! 0. Call demand is bounded even as becomes small:
7 virtual transportation cost and a measure of horizontal di¤erentiation. The lower is , the more di¤erentiated are the networks. I assume throughout that the utility v 0 of holding a subscription is su¢ ciently high that all consumers subscribe to one of the two networks, i.e. s 1 + s 2 = 1. In the situation where the two networks share the market, the market share of network i = 1; 2 equals:
The pro…t of network i equals
Each network derives its pro…ts from three sources. First, the network makes a pro…t on initiated calls if the call price r i exceeds the perceived marginal call cost Retail equilibrium Raising the call price t i lowers call demand since the network has fewer subscribers making less calls. This is marginal call pro…t below:
where x i = x(r i ; t i ) and @x i =@t i = @x(r i ; t i )=@t. The …nal term in the …rst row is a cost composition e¤ect. As the number of subscribers falls, more calls are terminated outside than inside the network. The composition e¤ect is negative whenever it is more costly to terminate o¤-net than on-net calls. The two terms in the second row re ‡ect the marginal e¤ect of a higher subscription fee on subscription pro…t and termination pro…t, respectively. Marginal termination demand is ambiguous. On the one hand, termination demand tends to fall because there are fewer subscribers to reach in network i. On the other hand, termination demand tends to increase because there are more subscribers calling from the other network. With full market 1 1 The restriction a cO on the termination rate is to avoid arbitrage. For a < cO, network i could make in…nite pro…ts by initiating an unbounded amount of o¤-net calls. Likewise, a non-negative call price, r 0, is necessary to prevent subscribers from making unbounded pro…ts on calls. However, t 0 is not necessary because of the assumption that consumers have at most one subscription. Also, I assume (realistically) that income I is so high that t < I at equilibrium. 8 coverage and a balanced call pattern, marginal termination demand is positive if and only if network i initially has more than 50 percent of the subscribers:
(1 2s i ).
Lemma 1 generalizes the existence and uniqueness results (Proposition 7) in La¤ont, Rey and Tirole (1998a) to the case of income e¤ects:
Lemma 1 Assume that network operators charge two-part tari¤ s and non-discriminatory call prices. If either (i) networks are di¤ erentiated ( is low); (ii) the termination rate is close to marginal termination cost (ja c T j is low) or (iii) each subscriber calls a small fraction of the total network ( is low), then there exists a unique and symmetric retail equilibrium (r (a); t (a)) characterized by r (a) = c + 1 2 (a c T ) and
Proof: The proof is standard; see Tangerås (2013) for the details.
A small reduction in the call price r has marginal bene…t @v=@r = xz 0 to every consumer in the network. This allows the operator to raise the subscription fee by x and keep all consumers equally well o¤ as before: x@v=@t = xz 0 . Hence, market shares remain unchanged. To the operator, the direct loss x=2 in call revenue is exactly o¤set by a corresponding increase in the subscription revenue of x=2. But, as total call demand increases, 12 the price reduction is strictly pro…table if the markup on call prices is positive (r > c+ 1 2 (a c T )). In the opposite case of a negative markup on call prices, the network operator strictly pro…ts from increasing the call price, thereby contracting call demand. At optimum, therefore, the network operator sets the call price equal to perceived marginal cost, and uses instead the subscription fee to compete for consumers.
The network balances a higher subscription markup against lower subscription demand and takes into account the e¤ect of a higher subscription fee on the marginal cost of initiated calls -the composition e¤ect. The other e¤ects in (5) are zero: Marginal call pro…t is zero because calls are priced at perceived marginal cost; marginal termination pro…t is zero because marginal termination demand is zero at symmetric market shares. Subscription pro…t, s i (t i f ), is strictly quasi-concave in the own subscription fee, and marginal subscription pro…t is increasing in the subscription fee of the competitor. Quasiconcavity and strategic complementarity carry over to marginal network pro…t for su¢ ciently low because then marginal call pro…t, the composition e¤ect and marginal termination pro…t are small in magnitude relative to marginal subscription pro…t; see (5). Consequently, (r ; t ) constitutes a unique equilibrium when is low.
1 2 The total e¤ect on call demand is @x=@r + x(@x=@t) = z 0 =(u 00 + z 00 r 2 ) > 0, where I have substituted in @x=@r and @x=@t from (2) and simpli…ed.
9
The semi-elasticity of subscription demand
is a measure of the intensity of competition for subscribers at equilibrium. The lower is the subscription semi-elasticity, the higher is the markup of the subscription fee t (a) over perceived
, where x (a) = x(r (a); t (a)) is equilibrium call demand. Obviously, the subscription semi-elasticity is lower the lower is the degree of network substitutability ( ) because tari¤s then matter less for the choice of network. Second, the subscription semi-elasticity is lower the lower is the marginal utility of income (z 0 ) because the subscription fee then is less important for consumer net surplus. Notice also that the subscription semi-elasticity is lower the lower are equilibrium consumer expenditures T (a) because marginal utility of income is decreasing (z 00 0).
The pro…t maximizing termination rate Unregulated networks choose the reciprocal termination rate a to maximize industry pro…t. By symmetry, this is the same as maximizing network pro…t
Networks do not pro…t at all from initiated calls because calls are priced at marginal cost. Instead, network pro…t stems entirely from the subscription fee and termination pro…t. Substitute the equilibrium subscription fee (6) into (a) above:
Owing to the balanced call pattern, termination pro…t is fully o¤set by the cost composition part of the subscription fee. The only e¤ect of the termination rate on network pro…t is through its e¤ect on the intensity of competition for subscribers. In the quasi-linear Hotelling framework, network di¤erentiation and marginal utility of income are both constant ( is constant and z 0 = 1). Thus, the intensity of competition is constant and therefore network pro…t is independent of the termination rate. 13 With a positive income e¤ect (z 00 < 0), marginal utility of income is lower the lower are consumer expenditures T (a). Hence, the networks'incentive to increase or 1 3 Pro…t neutrality holds also in the more general case of constant marginal utility of income di¤erent from unity, z(y) = y, because then (a) = 1=4 , which is still independent of a. More generally, all quasi-linear models in which subscription demand is determined by the di¤erence in consumer net surplus, i.e. si = g(vi v), feature a constant semi-elasticity, g 0 (0)=g(0), at symmetric prices and therefore imply pro…t neutrality. The random utility model …rst used by Dessein (2003) for the duopoly case and later extended by Calzada and Valletti (2008) to the general n 2 network case also belongs to this class of models: si = 1=(1 + (n 1)e 1 fv i vg ). However, pro…t neutrality does not imply that subscription demand is a function of the di¤erences vi v in consumer net surplus. For example, si = g((vi=v) v 1) has a constant semi-elasticity, g 0 (0)=g(0), at symmetric prices but is not a function of vi v.
lower the termination rate depends on the sensitivity of consumer expenditures to changes in the termination rate:
When call demand constitutes a normal good, consumer expenditures fall as the termination rate goes up (T 0 (a) < 0). This is the documented "waterbed" e¤ect (Genakos and Valletti, 2011) . In the more general case of positive income e¤ects, therefore, the networks pro…t from a high termination rate:
Proposition 1 Assume that network operators charge two-part tari¤ s and non-discriminatory call prices. Assume also that at least one of the following holds: (i) networks are di¤ erentiated ( is low); (ii) the termination rate is close to marginal termination cost (ja c T j is low); (iii) every subscriber calls only a small fraction of the total network ( is low).
1. Network pro…t is independent of the termination rate if and only if the income e¤ ect is zero ( 0 (a) = 0 if and only if z 00 (I T (a)) = 0).
Network pro…t is increasing in the termination rate for any positive income e¤ ect (
Proof: I establish that consumer expenditures T (a) de…ned in (7) satisfy T 0 (a) < 0. Then, 0 (a) = 0 if and only if z 00 (I T (a)) = 0, whereas 0 (a) > 0 if z 00 (I T (a)) < 0; see (9). By implicit di¤erentiation of the equilibrium subscription fee t de…ned in (6):
Substitute this expression into T 0 (a) to get
after simpli…cations, where in the last line I have used @x=@r and @x=@t characterized in (2).
Pro…t neutrality is a knife-edge result and hinges crucially on the semi-elasticity of subscription demand being constant at symmetric prices. In the presence of even the slightest income e¤ect, pro…t neutrality vanishes because then the semi-elasticity and therefore the intensity of competition depends on consumer expenditures. Even a weak income e¤ect has a strong e¤ect on the networks' choice of termination rate. Instead of being indi¤erent, the networks would now like to set the termination rate as high as possible. However, this does not mean that the termination rate will be in…nite. The upper bound on the termination rate is the point at which each network would instead deviate and corner the market. For a su¢ ciently high, Lemma 1 breaks down and network pro…t is no longer given by (8); see La¤ont, Rey and Tirole (1998a) for the formal proof in the quasi-linear case.
Social optimum Proposition 1 establishes that unregulated networks maximize the termination rate. Whether this incentive renders regulatory intervention desirable, depends on the pro…t maximizing termination rate relative to the social optimum. Under the assumption of unregulated retail competition, the social planner chooses the termination rate a to maximize the sum of consumer net surplus and industry pro…t
A termination rate di¤erent from marginal termination cost (a 6 = c T ) distorts prices. The …rst term below identi…es the ine¢ ciency associated with distorted consumption. Changing the termination rate also redistributes income between consumers and the networks. The second term below identi…es the cost/bene…t of redistribution:
The socially optimal termination rate a opt trades o¤ e¢ ciency and redistribution. The social planner redistributes income from the networks to consumers by setting a termination rate below marginal termination cost (a opt c T ) if consumers value income higher than the networks, i.e. z 0 (I T (c T )) 1. Conversely, if consumers'marginal utility of income is low, i.e. z 0 (I T (c T )) < 1, then the social planner allows upward distortions in prices (a opt > c T ) so as to transfer income to the networks. Even so, there is an upper bound a to the termination rate beyond which the social cost of price distortions o¤sets any welfare bene…ts of redistribution:
Proposition 2 Assume that network operators charge two-part tari¤ s and non-discriminatory call prices. Assume also that at least one of the following holds: (i) networks are di¤ erentiated ( is low); (ii) the termination rate is close to the marginal termination cost (ja c T j is low);
(iii) every subscriber calls only a small fraction of the total network ( is low).
1. If z 0 (I T (c T )) > 1, then the socially optimal termination rate a opt is below marginal termination cost c T .
Termination is priced at marginal termination cost at the social optimum,
where I have substituted t 0 (a) given in (10) into the …rst row and simpli…ed, and in the second row substituted in @x=@r, @x=@t from (2) and simpli…ed further. Furthermore,
Substituting (13) and (14) into w 0 (a) de…ned in (12) yields
where (a) = (c + a c T 2 )z 0 (I T (a)) c. The denominator on the right-hand side of (15) is positive, so the sign of w 0 (a) is the same as the sign of the numerator.
where I have substituted in T 0 (a) given in (11) and simpli…ed. Thus, w 0 (a) < 0 for all a > c T because (a)z 00 0 and (c T a) (z 0 ) 3 < 0. In this case, the socially optimal termination rate a opt is contained in
2 )z 0 (I) c because z 00 0. Thus, (a) > 0 for a large enough. Hence, there exists a unique a c T satisfying (a) = 0. Observe that w 0 (a) < 0 for all a > a c T because then (a)z 00 0 and
In the special case z 0 (I T (c T )) = 1, a = c T and therefore a opt = c T .
Propositions 1 and 2 jointly present a case for regulation under non-discriminatory call prices.
Unregulated networks would maximize the termination rate, whereas there is an upper bound a to the socially optimal termination rate. This holds for any positive income e¤ect. Whether termination should be priced above or below marginal cost at social optimum, depends on the 13 marginal utility of income, z 0 (I T (c T )), which can be di¢ cult to gauge in practice. However, the stronger is the concern with e¢ ciency relative to redistribution, the closer is the social optimum to marginal termination cost.
Network operators have an incentive to exaggerate costs under cost-based regulation of termination rates. Thus, regulatory authorities should view self-reported costs with skepticism. A solution would be to set a rate ceiling which is independent of self-reported costs, but instead targeted to some retail price index adjusted for technological development -the well-known RPI-X scheme.
4 Termination-based price discrimination: The o¤-net price puz- The budget constraint is binding, so consumer net utility equals
Price discrimination creates network externalities in the sense that the value of belonging to a network now also depends on the size of the network and not only on the tari¤ structure.
Because of the income e¤ect, both on-net demand q(p; b p; b t; b s) and o¤-net demand b q(p; b p; b t; b s)
depend on the on-net as well as o¤-net prices, on the subscription fee and on the relative sizes of the two networks. In rational expectations equilibrium where both networks have a positive market share,
de…nes subscription demand b s i as a function of call prices (p 1 ; b p 1 ; p 2 ; b p 2 ) and subscription fees ( b t 1 ; b t 2 ) of the two networks. The pro…t of network i equals
Retail equilibrium By increasing the subscription fee b t i , the network operator a¤ects marginal call pro…t through lower demand for on-net and o¤-net calls:
The …rst term on the second line is a composition e¤ect, same as under non-discriminatory pricing: Less subscribers means that relatively more calls are terminated o¤-net. The composition e¤ect could be positive or negative depending on the pro…tability of on-net calls relative to o¤-net calls. The second term in the second row captures the trade-o¤ between higher subscription revenue and the marginal loss in subscribers. The …nal term is the e¤ect on termination demand of charging a higher subscription fee. Because of the income e¤ect in call demand (@ b q=@b s 6 = 0), marginal termination demand could be non-zero even at symmetric market shares.
Lemma 2 generalizes the existence and uniqueness results (Proposition 5) in La¤ont, Rey and Tirole (1998b) to the case of income e¤ects:
Lemma 2 Assume that network operators charge two-part tari¤ s and price discriminate between on-net and o¤ -net calls. If either (i) networks are di¤ erentiated ( is low); (ii) the termination rate is close to marginal termination cost (ja c T j is low); or (iii) every subscriber calls only a small fraction of the total network ( is low), then there exists a unique and symmetric retail
Proof: See Tangerås (2013).
As under non-discriminatory pricing, each operator optimally sets call prices at perceived marginal cost and then uses the subscription fee to compete for subscribers. At optimum, the operator balances a higher subscription markup against lower subscription demand, accounting also for the e¤ect of a higher subscription fee on termination pro…t (@ b q=@b s 6 = 0). The marginal e¤ect of a higher subscription fee on call pro…t, the …rst term in (18), is zero because all calls are priced at marginal cost. The composition e¤ect in (18) is zero because the operator makes zero pro…t both on o¤-net and on-net calls. The equilibrium is unique and symmetric if every subscriber calls only a small fraction of the total network. The explanation is the same as under non-discriminatory prices: Subscription pro…t b s i ( b t i f ) constitutes the main part of network pro…t and is well-behaved whenever is small.
Let q (a) = q(c; c O + a; b t (a); 1=2) be equilibrium on-net demand as a function of the termination rate a, and de…ne equilibrium o¤-net demand b q (a) analogously. The subscription fee plus the amount the consumer spends on calls yield consumer expenditures
measures the intensity of competition for subscribers at equilibrium. As under non-discriminatory pricing, subscription elasticity depends on network di¤erentiation ( ) and marginal utility of income (z 0 ). An additional network multiplier in ‡uences the subscription elasticity. Under price discrimination, consumer net surplus b v depends on the size of the network; see (16). A positive network externality arises if the value
of connecting with a subscriber in the own network is higher than the value
of reaching a subscriber in the other network, i.e. @b v=@b s = ( (a) b (a)) > 0. A positive network externality implies that it is easier for a network to attract additional consumers by lowering the subscription fee, because a higher market share further accentuates the bene…t of belonging to that network. The e¤ect is double because of an additional negative network externality of equal magnitude in the competing network. A positive network externality bene…ts the individual network but is costly to the industry. In the end, the externality only serves to intensify competition for existing subscribers without attracting any new customers. To see this, observe that the subscription semi-elasticity in (20) is higher the stronger is the network externality ( (a) b (a)).
The networks in ‡uence the strength of the network multiplier by their choice of termination rate because the network externality depends on the price di¤erence b p p = a c T between o¤-net and on-net calls. For example, the network externality vanishes completely in case termination is priced at marginal cost, because o¤-net and on-net calls then have the same price, c. 14 In general, the marginal impact
on the network externality of increasing the termination rate is ambiguous. A higher o¤-net price has a direct and negative e¤ect on the value of reaching a subscriber in the other network, which serves to strengthen the externality. This is the …rst term on the right-hand side above.
The price increase also a¤ects consumer expenditures b T (a) and therefore the marginal utility of income. The second term on the right-hand side represents this income e¤ect, which could be positive or negative. The …rst e¤ect dominates the second e¤ect whenever the initial price di¤erence between o¤-net and on-net calls is small enough or the income e¤ect is weak enough.
In this case, the networks can soften the externality by lowering the termination rate a.
The pro…t maximizing termination rate The subscription fee and termination pro…t are the sole sources of network pro…t because on-net and o¤-net calls are priced at marginal cost:
Substitute the equilibrium subscription fee in (19) into b (a) above and use (20) to rewrite network pro…t in terms of the subscription markup and adjusted termination pro…t:
The marginal e¤ect on network pro…t of raising the termination rate above marginal termination cost equals:
The …rst, positive term is the marginal income e¤ect, which tends to soften competition and raise pro…t, same as under non-discriminatory prices; see (9). A higher termination rate also implies a stronger network externality, which instead intensi…es competition, thereby reducing pro…t. This is the second, negative term. The third and …nal term is the positive e¤ect of a marginally higher termination rate on termination pro…t. The marginal network externality 1 4 By the …rst-order conditions for call demand, u 0 (b q (a))=u 0 (q (a)) = (cO + a)=c, which implies u 0 (b q (cT )) = u 0 (q (cT )). By strict monotonicity of u 0 , b q (cT ) = q (cT ). Thus, (cT ) = b (cT ).
dominates marginal termination pro…t. 15 If the income e¤ect is weak (z 00 is close to zero), then operators prefer a termination rate below cost (Gans and King, 2001 ). On the other hand, if the networks are di¤erentiated ( is low), then network externalities matter relatively less for the choice of network. Under these circumstances, operators soften competition and raise pro…ts by setting a termination rate above cost:
Proposition 3 Assume that network operators charge two-part tari¤ s and price discriminate between on-net and o¤ -net calls. 2. The pro…t maximizing termination rate is below marginal termination cost for any degree of network di¤ erentiation , if the income e¤ ect is su¢ ciently weak (z 00 (y) is close to zero for all y 2 [0; I]) and either (i) the termination rate is close to the marginal termination cost (ja c T j is low); or (ii) every subscriber calls only a small fraction of the total network ( is low).
Proof: See the Appendix.
Social optimum Welfare equals the sum of consumer net surplus and industry pro…t:
A higher o¤-net price typically is mitigated by a lower subscription fee. This is the source of the waterbed e¤ect. The direct price e¤ect dominates the subscription e¤ect whenever the networks are di¤erentiated ( b t 0 + 2 b q 0; see the Appendix). In this case, a social planner who optimally redistributes income from the networks to consumers (z 0 1) does so by setting the termination rate below cost (b a opt c T ). If the income e¤ect is weak, the reduction in the subscription fee
dominates the higher o¤-net price ( b t 0 + 2 b q 0), and the social planner optimally redistributes income to the consumers by setting a termination rate above cost (b a opt c T ):
Proposition 4 Assume that network operators charge two-part tari¤ s and price discriminate between on-net and o¤ -net calls. Assume also that consumers value income higher than the networks (z 0 (I) 1).
1. For any positive income e¤ ect (z 00 (y) < 0 for all y 2 [0; I]) and if networks are su¢ ciently di¤ erentiated ( is low), the socially optimal termination rate b a opt lies below marginal termination cost c T .
2. The socially optimal termination rate lies above marginal termination cost for any degree of network di¤ erentiation , if the income e¤ ect is su¢ ciently weak (z 00 (y) is close to zero for all y 2 [0; I]) and either (i) the termination rate is close to the marginal termination cost (ja c T j is low); or (ii) every subscriber calls only a small fraction of the total network ( is low).
A comparison of Propositions 3 and 4 reveals that pro…t maximizing networks sometimes set excessive termination rates and under other circumstances choose termination rates that are too low from society's viewpoint under termination-based price discrimination. Whether termination rates should be regulated up or down, depends on marginal utility of income and the strength of the income e¤ect relative to network di¤erentiation. When networks are di¤erentiated, it follows that b a > c T b a opt , and the termination rates should be capped. On the other hand, b a < c T b a opt if the income e¤ect is weak, and the regulator should impose a termination rate ‡oor.
Second-degree price discrimination
The analysis has so far built upon the assumption that all consumers are identical -up to a constant measuring horizontal di¤erentiation. Homogeneity implies that network operators only o¤er one contract each. I now turn to the more compelling case of heterogenous preferences:
Some consumers prefer subscriptions with on-net/o¤-net discrimination, while others prefer contracts in which all calls are equal. Contracts are required to be incentive compatible because operators cannot distinguish ex ante between di¤erent types of consumers.
Second-degree price discrimination has interesting implications for network competition and for unregulated termination rates. In particular, unregulated networks may pro…t from increasing the termination rate above cost even if they would not do so under complete information termination-based price discrimination, i.e. when a large share of consumers demand on-net/o¤-net contracts and income e¤ects are weak.
The model There are two types of consumers, informed ones in share and uninformed ones in share 1 . An informed consumer is someone who knows whether the called party belongs to the own network or is located o¤-net. An uninformed consumer has no information about the recipient's network. These types are uniformly distributed on the unit interval and statistically independent of one another.
Network i o¤ers an on-net/o¤-net contract fq i ; b q i ; b T i g designed for the informed consumers, where q i (b q i ) is the number of on-net (o¤-net) calls the subscriber is allowed to make to each member of its personal network, and b T i is the subscription fee. An additional non-discriminatory contract fx i ; T i g is intended for the uninformed consumers, where x i denotes the number of calls the subscriber is allowed to make to each member of its personal network, on and o¤-net alike, and T i is the subscription fee. 16 Under the assumption that consumers only call other consumers of the same type (see, e.g. Dessein, 2003) , 17 the on-net/o¤-net contract is incentive compatible if and only if
where
is the number of informed consumers in network i (j). 18
An important aspect of second-degree price discrimination in this dimension is that incentive compatibility is a¤ected, not only by the network's own choice of contracts, but also by the contracts o¤ered by the competitor through the network externality:
The Revelation Principle does not require i's contracts to respect the IC constraints of j's consumers. Rather, it is necessary to account for the possibility of incentive incompatibility in subscription demand. Thus
is the number of consumers subscribing to i's on-net/o¤-net contract in rational expectations equilibrium when the market is fully covered. The indicator function J takes the value 1 if j's on-net/o¤-net contract is strictly incentive compatible (b v j > u(x j ) T j ) and the value 0 if it is instead strictly incentive incompatible (b v j < u(x j ) T j ). Observe that the intensity of competition as measured by the semi-elasticity (@b s i =@ b T i )=b s i depends on whether j's IC constraint is satis…ed or not.
Let v(x i ; T i ) = (1 ) u(x i ) + z(I T i ) be consumer net surplus the uninformed consumer achieves by selecting fx i ; T i g. Switching to the on-net/o¤-net contract creates a variance in 1 6 A maximum call allowance paired with a subscription fee is a common type of non-discriminatory contract. Specifying separate on-net and o¤-net call allowances is peculiar, but for simplifying purposes only. The equilibrium on-net/o¤-net contract can equivalently be reformulated as a two-part tari¤, fc; cO + a; b t m g. 1 7 The assumption of type dependent call demand hugely simpli…es the analysis without a¤ecting the qualitative insights. I discuss robustness to alternative call patterns at the end of the section. 1 8 As a simpli…cation, I assume away income e¤ects for informed consumers: The utility of consuming the numeraire good equals z(y) = y, same as in A-LRT. If anything, this departure from Section 4 biases networks to favour termination rates below cost by removing the positive marginal income e¤ect of the on-net/o¤-net contract present in (23).
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consumer net surplus because the consumer then has incomplete information about the number of calls available to her (or about total call expenditures under two-part tari¤s). If uninformed consumers are su¢ ciently risk averse, then networks o¤er these subscribers non-discriminatory contracts. 19 Also, they would not select an on-net/o¤-net contract over a non-discriminatory contract. I thus neglect the incentive constraint on the non-discriminatory contract in what follows, but verify that it is indeed satis…ed in the relevant range of termination rates (Tangerås, 2013) . In a fully covered market, demand for network i's non-discriminatory contract thus equals
The Lagrangian of network i reads (28) where i is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the IC constraint (25). Each network derives its pro…ts from two sources, subscription fees and termination pro…t. Perceived marginal subscription cost now also includes call cost in addition to the direct cost f .
Retail equilibrium By increasing the subscription fee, b T i , of the on-net/o¤-net contract the network earns a higher markup per subscriber, but at the cost of lower subscription demand.
This trade-o¤ represents marginal subscription pro…t below:
The second term in the …rst row is the cost composition e¤ect stemming from a larger amount of calls being terminated o¤-net than on-net as the number of subscribers falls. Marginal termination pro…t is ambiguous as before, but zero at symmetric market shares owing to the balanced call pattern. An increase in the subscription fee of the on-net/o¤-net contract makes it harder to satisfy the IC constraint (25), hence the negative marginal incentive e¤ect.
An analogous trade-o¤ faces network i when choosing the optimal subscription fee, T i , of the 1 9 The most extreme manifestation would be lexicographic preferences towards price stability.
21 non-discriminatory contract:
Marginal termination pro…t is zero at symmetric market shares even here. An increase in the subscription fee of the non-discriminatory contract renders the on-net/o¤-net contract comparatively more attractive to informed consumers, hence the positive marginal incentive e¤ect.
and the non-discriminatory contract fx m ; T m g de…ned by
and
plus the associated complementary slackness conditions
and the multiplicity restriction
jointly characterize a symmetric retail equilibrium if (a c T ) (b q x m ) 0 and either: (i) the networks are di¤ erentiated ( is low); (ii) every subscriber calls only a small fraction of the total network ( is low); (iii) the termination rate is close to marginal termination cost and the share of informed consumers is high (ja c T j is low and is high). For every termination rate a 6 = c T with multiple equilibria, the unique pay-o¤ dominant equilibrium is given by m (a) = 0 if a > c T and m (a) = 1 if a < c T .
Call allowances, q and b q , are set at their …rst-best level (i.e. where marginal call utility equals perceived marginal call cost) in the on-net/o¤-net contract. This is an incidence of the classical "no-distortion-at-the-top" result. Call allowances are distorted in the non-discriminatory contract to extract consumer informational rent. A reduction in the call allowance, x m , below the …rst-best level renders the non-discriminatory contract less attractive to all consumers. The network compensates the uninformed consumer by lowering also the subscription fee, T m . If her marginal utility of income is high or her personal network relatively small ( z 0 (I T m ) > 1 ), only a small reduction in the subscription fee is required to keep the uninformed consumer equally well o¤ as before. But for the informed consumer, whose marginal utility of income is much lower, or whose personal network, , is comparatively larger, the lower fee is insu¢ cient to fully compensate the reduced call allowance. The increased leverage allows the network operator to pro…tably increase the subscription fee, b T m , while still maintaining incentive compatibility.
Call allowances are not necessarily distorted below the …rst-best level at equilibrium. If uninformed consumers have a low marginal utility of income or a relatively large personal network
, then the network can increase the call allowance, x m , slightly and the subscription fee, T m , substantially without hurting the uninformed consumer. The increased call allowance is insu¢ cient to fully compensate the informed consumer for the higher subscription fee. Now the operator can pro…table raise even the subscription fee, b T m , up to the point at which the IC constraint is once again binding.
In the special case, z 0 (I T m ) = 1 , transfers are simply redistributed between the two consumer types without generating any additional revenue to the …rm. The equilibrium call allowance, x m , thus remains at its …rst-best level even if the IC constraint is binding; see Dessein (2003) and references therein for similar results. Kinked subscription demand implies that the semi-elasticity of the on-net/o¤-net contract is unde…ned at equilibrium. Instead, a continuum of pseudo-elasticities bounded by the directional elasticities are consistent with pro…t maximization:
Binding IC constraints yield a continuum of symmetric retail equilibria 2 [0; 1], hence the restriction (35). Still, equilibrium selection according to pay-o¤ dominance is straightforward:
Competition for subscribers is weaker and network pro…t higher, the lower is the elasticity of subscription demand. Hence, the pay-o¤ dominant equilibrium is given by m (a) = 0 for all a > c T (and by m (a) = 1 for all a < c T ). Under complete information, or if the incentive constraint is non-binding, then the semi-elasticity is well-de…ned with = 1 in (36) , and the symmetric equilibrium is unique.
In the non-discriminatory contract, the equilibrium semi-elasticity of subscription demand
is identical to (7) in Section 3.
The Lagrangian multiplier m (a) in Lemma 3 de…nes the shadow price on the IC constraint.
A large m (a) calls for severe distortions in the allowance, x m , and a strong downward (upward) adjustment in the subscription fee of the on-net/o¤-net (non-discriminatory) contract to restore incentive compatibility. On the other hand, the shadow price could be zero at equilibrium. Let fq ; b q ; b T m 0 g and fx m 0 ; T m 0 g be the complete information, "null" contracts (i.e. assuming that m = 0 and = 1 in Lemma 3). If termination is priced at marginal cost, then the informed consumer's net bene…t of picking her designated null contract equals
where in the second line I have substituted in the equilibrium subscription fees from Lemma 3. If marginal utility of income does not deviate too much from unity, then call allowances q and x m 0 (c T ) and subscription markups are nearly the same in both contracts. 20 In this case, the di¤erence between the two contracts mainly is captured by the di¤erences in adjusted marginal costs, the last two terms in the above expression. Termination rates Assume that the two network operators are able to coordinate on the pay-o¤ dominant retail equilibrium. At termination rates above cost, network pro…t equals
under second-degree price discrimination, after substituting in the subscription fees from Lemma 3 into the Lagrangian (28) and simplifying. Network pro…t can be divided in three parts: The average subscription markup weighted by the relative sizes of the two consumer groups, net 2 0 Note from eq. (32) Tangerås (2013) shows that fq ; b q ; b T m g and fx m ; T m g satisfy even the IC constraint of the non-discriminatory contract for a su¢ ciently close to cT , large enough and z 0 (I T m 0 (cT )) 1 not too small.
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termination pro…t, and consumer informational rent.
Second-degree price discrimination has an ambiguous e¤ect on the average subscription markup. On the one hand, a weaker network externality ( m (a) 1) softens competition for informed consumers and raises the subscription markup of the on-net/o¤-net contract. On the other hand, incentive compatibility drives up the subscription fee, T m (a), which lowers the subscription markup of the non-discriminatory contract.
Net termination pro…t is de…ned as gross termination pro…t less the cost composition e¤ect.
The composition e¤ect and termination pro…t cancel out in the non-discriminatory contract, just as in Section 3. A net termination pro…t remains in the on-net/o¤-net contract owing to the di¤erence in on-net and o¤-net call volumes. Net termination pro…t is independent of second-degree price discrimination because call allowances q and b q (a) are at their …rst-best levels with or without incentive problems.
Consumer informational rent could be positive, zero or negative under second-degree price discrimination. If marginal utility of income of uninformed consumers is relatively high (z 0 (I T m ) > 1), then competition for uninformed (informed) consumers is relatively intense (weak) as measured by the di¤erence between the two semi-elasticities (37) and (36) . This di¤erence in competitive pressure implies that operators tend to balance marginal pro…t distortions by reducing the subscription fee of the on-net/o¤-net contract instead of increasing the subscription fee of the non-discriminatory contract. Consequently, the average equilibrium subscription fee, b T m +(1 )T m , falls relative to the case with complete information, and consumer informational rent is positive. In the opposite case (z 0 (I T m ) < 1), network operators restore incentive compatibility mostly by increasing the subscription fee of the non-discriminatory contract. This, in turn, leaves a negative informational rent to consumers at equilibrium.
Despite its e¤ect on network pro…t, second-degree price discrimination alone does not alter the basic insight of the workhorse model that termination rates above cost are unpro…table under on-net/o¤-net discrimination. Assume that marginal utility of income is constant and equal to unity for both consumer groups, i.e. z(y) = y. Then the subscription markup of the non-discriminatory contract is independent of the termination rate and equal to (1 )=4 .
Moreover, consumer informational rent is zero because IC constraints only redistribute rent between informed and informed consumers with no direct e¤ect on the expected subscription fee. What is left for network operators, is to trade the cost of a reinforced network externality o¤ against the bene…t of a higher termination pro…t:
While second-degree price discrimination may soften the marginal network externality considerably, the externality is still strong enough to dominate marginal termination pro…t at termination rates above marginal termination cost:
Proposition 5 If consumers' marginal utility of income is constant and equal to unity (as in A-LRT), then unregulated network operators maximize pro…t under second-degree price discrimination by agreeing on a termination rate at or below marginal termination cost (z(y) = y implies
Proof: If z(y) = y, then m (c T ) = 1=4 , as is easily veri…ed. Hence,
which is strictly positive for all a > c T because m (a) 0, q > b q (a), and q is the unique maximizer of u(q) cq.
Consider now a more general utility function z(y) 6 = y. Assume also that the IC (25) is strictly binding. 22 In this case, the general trade-o¤ facing network operators is:
Marginal network externality plus marginal termination pro…t
Marginal termination pro…t under second-degree price discrimination di¤ers from marginal termination pro…t b 0 (a) under termination-based price discrimination, see (23), in two fundamental aspects. First, second-degree price discrimination weakens the network multiplier to such an extent ( m (a) = 0 < 1) that the marginal network externality now is close in magnitude to marginal termination pro…t. In fact, the two cancel out at a termination rate equal to marginal cost. Second, a rent extraction motive comes into play under second-degree price discrimination. A higher termination rate makes the on-net/o¤-net contract more valuable to consumers because a stronger network externality intensi…es retail competition. The value of the nondiscriminatory contract falls because a higher termination rate softens retail competition for uninformed consumers through the marginal income e¤ect. A higher termination rate thus relaxes the IC constraint of the on-net/o¤-net contract, thereby causing the shadow price on the
then network operators extract informational rent by agreeing on a higher termination rate.
The pro…tability of increasing the termination rate above cost is driven entirely by the strength of the marginal income e¤ect relative to marginal rent extraction. The marginal income e¤ect is positive for any positive income e¤ect (z 00 < 0) because of the waterbed e¤ect (T m0 (a) < 0) and dominates the trade-o¤ unless consumer informational rent is too negative (z 0 (I T m ) < 1 is small). If the income e¤ect is zero, but consumer informational rent positive (z(y) = y, > 1), marginal rent extraction alone makes it pro…table to raise the termination rate above 2 2 The IC constraint is strictly binding if, for example, the termination rate is su¢ ciently close to marginal cost (a cT > 0 is small), the share of informed consumers is large and marginal utility of income is not too far from unity, i.e. 2. The unregulated termination rate is excessive from a welfare viewpoint (a m > a opt ).
Proof: See Tangerås (2013).
Under complete information, termination-based price discrimination it is strictly unpro…table to set a termination rate above cost if the income e¤ect is weak; see Proposition 3. But Proposition 6 shows that a minor modi…cation is su¢ cient to reverse this conclusion and render it strictly pro…table to set a termination rate above cost. By introducing a little bit of consumer heterogeneity, in the sense that a small share of consumers demand non-discriminatory contracts ( . 1), and assuming network operators to be incompletely informed about preferences, networks …nd it optimal to engage in second-degree price discrimination. 23 Figure 2 compares network pro…t, b (a), under termination-based price discrimination (assuming z(y) = y in (22)) with network pro…t m (a) under second-degree price discrimination.
Consumer informational rent causes network pro…t to shift downwards: m (c T ) < b (c T ). At the same time, second-degree price discrimination softens competition for informed consumers through a smaller network multiplier, which rotates the pro…t function counter-clockwise. The network multiplier is so weak under second-degree price discrimination that networks strictly pro…t from setting a termination rate above cost. While each network su¤ers a unilateral loss from being incompletely informed about consumer preferences, the industry may nevertheless gain. For high enough termination rates, competition is weak enough to outweigh the informational rent paid to consumers: m (a) > b (a) for all a > b.
2 3 In the opposite case, when the share of informed consumers is low enough and j1 z 0 (I T m 0 (cT ))j is low, then the null contract fq ; b q ; b T m 0 g is incentive compatible for all termination rates su¢ ciently low (Tangerås, 2013) . If the income e¤ect is positive, then m0 (a) > 0 for all a 2 [ cO; cT ]. Hence, Proposition 1 extends to the case of a small, but positive share of consumers on-net/o¤-net contracts. If the share, , of informed consumers is high enough or marginal utility of income is close enough to unity, then e¢ ciency considerations dominate redistribution, and the social optimum is to set the termination rate close to or below marginal termination cost. The unregulated termination rate is excessive, as stated in Proposition 6.
Discussion The main mechanism which softens competition under second-degree price discrimination is the binding IC constraint on the on-net/o¤-net contract which eliminates the negative network externality in the competing network and leads to a kinked subscription demand. This mechanism should arise in any model in which IC constraints interact with network externalities and therefore is not particular to this speci…c model.
The assumption that only consumers of the same type call each other is simpli…es the analysis, but is not restrictive. Tangerås (2013) considers an alternative setup in which all consumers call each other. Under a type independent call pattern, network externalities depend also on the properties of the non-discriminatory contract because the value of the on-net/o¤-net contract now is a function of i's entire network size, b s i + s i . Second, marginal termination rates are non-zero even at symmetric market shares. 25 These two e¤ects render the characterization of equilibrium retail contracts even more complicated than in Lemma 3 without adding any new qualitative insights regarding the choice of termination rates. Marginal network pro…t is the same as in (40), except (a c T )b q 0 (a)=4 in the …rst line of (40) is multiplied by instead of 2 to account for the larger network under type independent call pattern.
Conclusion
A main concern with network competition is the termination rates operators charge for connecting calls from each other. The perception is that unregulated networks can use termination rates to distort prices and competition. Therefore, termination rates usually are regulated. Yet, authorities tend to view regulation of telecommunications as temporary, at least in Europe:
"As normal market conditions develop, regulation can be rolled back, and competition law, as applied to industry in general, will replace sector-speci…c intervention" (European Commission, 2007) . A relevant question is whether markets now have developed so far that deregulation is viable.
2 5 Demand for termination in network i is given by (si + b si)(sjxj + b sj b qj) under type-independent call demand. The marginal e¤ect of an increase in b
Ti is (sjxj si b qj + (b sj b si)b qj)@b si=@ b Ti, which is di¤erent from zero at symmetric market shares in the general case xj 6 = b qj.
Most of the literature on network competition concludes that unregulated operators either are indi¤erent or would negotiate termination rates below marginal termination cost. As technological development has pushed marginal costs down towards zero, the potential for setting termination rates below cost now is limited. Yet, there are circumstances under which operators would instead prefer positive markups; for example, if market coverage is incomplete and total subscription demand elastic (Jullien et al., 2013) , or if …xed-to-mobile termination represents a substantial source of income to mobile operators (Armstrong and Wright, 2009 This paper analyses the role of income e¤ects in call demand. I show that weak income e¤ects are enough to drive unregulated termination rates above cost if networks charge nondiscriminatory call prices. This holds even under termination-based price discrimination if networks are di¤erentiated. Under second-degree price discrimination, network operators pro…t from increasing termination rates above cost if the share of consumers on discriminatory contracts is high, and consumer informational rent is positive. Income e¤ects are inherent to consumer preferences and likely to persist independently of market developments on the supply side. Deregulation could therefore lead to a jump in termination rates and corresponding welfare losses even in advanced telecommunications markets.
